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I. INTRODUCTION 
Hong Kong has been a British colony since 1841 and as such has 
pursued a markedly different economic, legal, political and social path 
from that of China. While China has embraced communist ideology and 
practice, often in an extreme form, Hong Kong has unwaveringly main-
tained its capitalist orientation and has remained an integral part of the 
Western world. The bulk of the colony's population has always been Chi-
nese and its cultural roots lie deeply in Chinese soil. In most other re-
spects, however, the two systems are almost completely at variance with 
each other. 
Despite the structural differences between Hong Kong and China, 
Hong Kong will shed its colonial status in 1997 and come under de facto 
Chinese sovereignty. After protracted negotiations, the People's Republic 
of China (PRC) and the United Kingdom have concluded an agreement 
on the future of Hong Kong which stipulates that the PRC will resume 
the "exercise of sovereignty" over the colony as of July 1, 1997 and that 
thereafter, Hong Kong will function for a period of 50 years as a "special 
administrative region" (SAR) of the PRC.1 
The transition from British to Chinese rule is an event of enormous 
political magnitude with far-reaching repercussions. It raises a host of 
complex issues, both academic and practical. Many of these issues have 
already attracted the attention of scholars and policy-makers. 2 
Thus far, however, there has been little discussion from an interna-
tional legal perspective of the radical changes under way. The arrange-
ment for Hong Kong's future envisaged by the PRC and the United 
Kingdom has no exact precedent in the international legal arena and con-
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1. Draft Agreement between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land, and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong, 
White Paper (Sept. 26, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1366 (1984)[hereinafter cited as The 
Draft Agreement]. 
2. The University of Hong Kong, for instance, recently held a conference devoted exclu-
sively to the 1997 question which provided a useful vehicle for a multifaceted examination 
of transition-related problems. See HONG KONG AND 1997: STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE (Y. 
C. Jao ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as STRATEGIES]. 
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sequently, should be of great interest to students of international law. 
Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that experts in this field will apply 
themselves earnestly to the subject in the near future. The aim of the 
present article is to provide, in the interim, a preliminary analysis of a 
number of key international legal issues which emanate from the Sino-
British agreement. This is a challenging task given the sui generis posi-
tion of Hong Kong vis-a-vis external entities and the diverging attitudes 
towards international law by the two principal parties involved, the PRC 
and the UK. 
It is obvious that the legal facets of the agreement surrounding Hong 
Kong's future cannot be dissected in the light of established principles of 
international law alone. The PRC stance on many issues is so fundamen-
tally different from the one embraced by the non-communist world that 
an alternative approach is called for. Ideally, a synthesis should be sought 
reflecting conventional international legal norms, the Chinese posture, 
and the realities of Hong Kong's geo-strategic situation. In this article, 
such a synthesis is attempted with respect to the questions of sovereignty, 
treaties, state succession and nationality. 
II. HONG KONG'S UNIQUE STATUS 
Hong Kong, as a British dependent territory, lacks the main attrib-
utes of statehood from the standpoint of public international law. It can 
thus be deemed as having little, if any, international legal personality. 
The colony does have a legislature capable of legislating extensively on 
domestic law and an executive and judiciary with similar powers which 
may impinge on the UK's discharge of its international obligations. Its 
external links, however, both as a matter of fact and as a proposition of 
law, are largely managed by the UK authorities. 
At the same time, and here lies the colony's uniqueness, the commer-
cial and industrial prominence of Hong Kong has given it a considerable 
measure of independence in international contexts.3 To illustrate, the col-
ony is treated as a separate territory for the purpose of multilateral agree-
ments such as the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).4 
It is also a member of several international organizations including the 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), the Asian Productivity Organization (APO) and the Asian De-
velopment Bank (ADB). Furthermore, in several instances over the past 
decades, the Hong Kong Government, "acting with the consent of" the 
3. For an elaboration and further illustrations, see Dick, The Law and Practice of Hong 
Kong and Foreign Investment, in INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS IN ASIA 153 (V. Shepherd 
ed. 1956). 
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; U.N. Con-
ference on Trade and Development, 609 U.N.T.S. 3. 
1986 CHINESE RULE IN HONG KONG 173 
UK authorities, has negotiated agreements directly with foreign govern-
ments concerning such crucial matters as textile quotas.5 I t is also worth 
noting that local officials have concluded a number of agreements with 
the Provincial government of Guandong on questions of significant mu-
tual interest, such as the supply of water.6 
Indeed, the high degree of independence enjoyed by Hong Kong in 
the management of its external affairs has been reaffirmed in the Sino-
British agreement which seeks to formalize its status as a "separate cus-
toms territory" that "may participate in relevant international organiza-
tions and international trade agreements (including preferential trade ar-
rangements), such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and 
arrangements regarding international trade in textiles."7 The agreement 
also states that after 1997 the Hong Kong SAR "may on its own, using 
the name 'Hong Kong, China' maintain and develop relations and con-
clude and implement agreements with states, regions and relevant organi-
zations in the appropriate fields including the economic, trade, financial 
and monetary, shipping, communications, touristic, cultural and sporting 
fields."8 Finally, the agreement enables the SAR to participate in interna-
tional organizations and conferences and trade agreements either as a 
member of the PRC delegation or in any other capacity as may be per-
mitted by the Chinese authorities. The agreement may thus be seen as 
not merely reinforcing Hong Kong's unique position as a fairly indepen-
dent actor in the international arena, but also lending to it additional 
substance. Under such circumstances, one can regard the territory as an 
entity approximating an international legal personality, with its own 
rights and obligations. Consequently, it is appropriate to examine ques-
tions of international law which originate from this unprecedented 
configuration. 
III. CONTRASTING CHINESE AND BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
While enjoying a notable measure of independence, Hong Kong is 
constrained in its external policy-making. It remains a British depen-
dency and at the same time is increasingly sensitive to Chinese interests 
and wishes. Therefore, Hong Kong must operate within a complex legal 
framework, particularly since the PRC and the UK employ concepts of 
international law which are often extremely difficult to reconcile. 
This complexity stems from the fact that the PRC's notion of law in 
general and its assumptions regarding the role, function, validity, and jus-
5. Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, Misc. 18, UK 
Command Papers 6205 [hereinafter cited as MFA]. The Arrangement is indexed in M.J. 
BOWMAN & D.J. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS NO. 209 
(1984). 
6. See Water Supplies Department, Fact Sheet 1985. 
7. The Draft Agreement, annex I, § 6, para. 1, supra note 1, at 1387. 
8. Id. annex I, § XI, at 1376. 
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tification of the legal system do not coincide with those prevailing in the 
West.9 Traditional Western doctrines portray the law as emanating from 
the people, thus according greater importance to the needs of the individ-
ual.10 The Chinese idea of law is based on a set of norms which give clear 
preference to collective needs. Under the Western scheme, a strong em-
phasis is placed on codifying the law with a view to minimizing arbitrary 
conduct by power holders. By contrast, the PRC system distinguishes be-
tween li and fa (roughly translated as "customary norms of behavior" and 
"enacted law" respectively) with li normally prevailing." 
Perhaps the most significant practical difference between the atti-
tudes of the two doctrines is that law is generally viewed in the West as a 
variable reflecting rather than causing societal change, whereas Chinese 
authorities perceive law as a political instrument of the State explicitly 
designed to serve political objectives. This applies to international as well 
as domestic law. As the Chinese scholar, Cho Fun-Ian has elucidated: 
International law in addition to being a body of principles and norms 
which must be observed by every country is also, just as any law, a 
political instrument; whether a country is socialist or capitalist, it will 
to a certain degree utilize international law in implementing its for-
eign policy.1* 
Parallel views have been expressed by other well-known Chinese 
writers. Scott cites Chu li-lu, for instance, as stating that if international 
law is disadvantageous to the PRC, to the Socialist system or to the peace 
of the whole world, it should not be relied upon.13 This instrumental con-
ception of international law by the Chinese renders generalization about 
Hong Kong's future status rather difficult. For the dominant ideology in 
the PRC and the state/party interests, as interpreted by its ruling elite, 
are in constant flux and not likely to remain static on a strategic issue 
such as Hong Kong. Though one is compelled to grapple with elusive po-
litical variables, the PRC is in the process of moderating its practice of 
bending the law to promote political goals.14 
IV. T H E ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY 
Sovereignty is often employed indiscriminately and accorded differ-
ent meanings by decision-makers and scholars alike. The reason for the 
9. See generally Lee, Introduction to the Chinese Concept of Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 
439 (1962); Li, The Role-of Law in Communist China, 82 CHINA Q. 66 (1970). On the PRC's 
attitude towards international law, see, e.g., Chiu, Communist China's Attitude Toward In-
ternational Law, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 245 (1966). 
10. J.C. SMITH & D. WEISSTUB, T H E WESTERN IDEA OF LAW 3 (1983). 
11. Lee, supra note 9, at 448-9. 
12. Quoted in G. SCOTT, CHINESE TREATIES: THE POST REVOLUTIONARY RESTORATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 45 (1975). 
13. Id. at 46. 
14. Salinger, The Fifth National People's Congress and the Process of Policy Making: 
Reform, Readjustment and the Opposition, 22 ASIAN SURV. 1238, 1242 (1982). 
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vague and inconsistent usage of the term lies in the fact that sovereignty 
is a highly emotive symbol which is, inter alia, relied upon to induce a 
favorable response from the public in an era of nationalistic fervor. Two 
basic distinctions may nonetheless be drawn. 
First, a distinction exists between the political or philosophical no-
tion of sovereignty and the legal one. In its political or philosophical as-
pect sovereignty is perceived as an ideal. Thus, sovereignty, in conjunc-
tion with independence and equality as the classical attributes of the 
nation state," is deemed by nations throughout the Third World (includ-
ing China) as both the means of achieving national dignity and the mea-
sure of success in progressing towards this goal. The legal notion of sover-
eignty, however, hinges on a legal concept, or more precisely, a series of 
legal concepts. 
This raises the second distinction between sovereignty in the interna-
tional sense (i.e., as a crucial characteristic of independent states) and 
sovereignty as it is construed in the domestic law of any national entity. 
These concepts do not fully overlap since they are governed by different 
systems of law. Whereas the characteristics of a state as a member of the 
international community are defined by international law, the internal 
distribution of sovereignty of each state is determined by the rules of its 
own domestic law (i.e., its constitution).1' 
This distinction is highlighted in a dictum of a High Court judge in 
the local case of Winfat Enterprises (HK) Co. Ltd. v. Attorney General." 
Mr. Justice Kempster stated that the New Territories Order in Council 
1898 "formally vested sovereignty in and dominion over the New Territo-
ries in her Majesty."18 This is a clear statement of domestic law which 
does not affect the question of whether, as a matter of international law, 
sovereignty over the New Territories is vested in the UK. 
In essence, a legally sovereign state in the eyes of the international 
community is one which is capable of exercising plenary powers in rela-
tion to its territory without being legally subordinate to the will of any 
other state.18 However, given the evolutionary nature of international law, 
sovereignty may be subject to modifications. Specifically, the scope of le-
gal sovereignty in the international sense may expand or contract accord-
ing to changes in the law. States are free to restrict their own sovereignty 
by entering into treaty relationships including some comprehensive 
15. M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-16 (4th ed. 
1982). 
16. For an elaboration of this distinction and its application in the Hong Kong context, 
see Dicks, Treaty, Grant, Usage or Sufferance?: Some Legal Aspects of the Status of Hong 
Kong, 95 CHINA Q. 427, 430-1 (1983). 
17. [1983] Hong Kong L. Rep. 211 (High Court). 
18. Id. at 217. 
19. Basically, plenary powers are the sum total of jurisdicational and legislative powers 
and correlative rights conferred on it by international law. See 1 D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 283-85 (2d ed. 1970). 
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schemes, such as the EEC. Indeed, there has been a trend since the end 
of the Second World War towards a more restrictive interpretation of 
sovereignty in the international context. This trend is reflected in the 
adoption of legal restraints on the use of force,20 the enhancement of the 
institutional role of the UN and other international organizations21 and 
the international protection of human rights.22 
At the same time, distinct groups of states object strongly to interna-
tionalism. In particular, the Soviet Union and its communist allies insist 
on the inviolability and inalienability of national sovereignty. And not 
surprisingly, this interpretation of sovereignty has also been favored by 
the PRC. In fact, sovereignty is deemed by the PRC as the core of all 
fundamental principles of international law and, furthermore, as the legal 
foundation on which institutions and norms are grounded.23 Chinese writ-
ings on the Charter-based international order emphasize the traditional 
positivist notion of sovereignty.24 PRC experts have emphatically stressed 
that sovereignty is the most important principle of international law and 
the most valuable characteristic of the state. Any attempts to subvert, 
dilute or transfer sovereignty through such devices as "world law" or 
"transnational law" have consistently been dismissed as contrary to inter-
national law. 
In the same vein, Chinese representatives have denied a legal person-
ality to the UN by challenging the notion that international organizations 
could become subjects of international law. They have contended that the 
UN is merely an international organization among sovereign states and 
not a world government.25 These representatives have also repudiated the 
idea that individuals might enjoy a similar status. Such extensions of the 
concept of international legal personality are frowned upon by the PRC 
lest they devalue the supremacy of state sovereignty.26 
This rigid Chinese view of sovereignty has manifested itself through 
criticisms levelled by PRC commentators against the role of the UN in 
the maintenance of international peace and security. These commentators 
20. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
21. For example, the Convention of the International Labor Organization, Oct. 9, 1946, 
38 U.N.T.S. 3. 
22. Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221. 
23. See generally, Shao-Chuan, Chinese Law, in SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW 242-67 
(1965). See also, T'ao Ying, A Criticism of Bourgeois International Law Concerning the 
Question of State Sovereignty, in 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMEN-
TARY STUDY 106-110 (J.A. Cohen & H. Chiu eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1 PEOPLE'S 
CHINA]; Hsin & Chien, Expose and Criticize the Imperialist Fallacy Concerning the Ques-
tion of State Sovereignty, in id. at 110-17. 
24. See generally 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, id. 
25. It should be noted in this connection that Chinese scholars have long maintained 
that General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding but are merely recommendatory. 
See 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 23, at 88, 97-8. 
26. See S. KIM, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER (1979). 
1986 CHINESE RULE IN HONG KONG 177 
have been adamant that the exercise of such a role by the UN is tanta-
mount to interference in the domestic affairs of states in violation of Arti-
cle 2(7) of the UN Charter.27 Indeed, China's sensitivity about interna-
tional interference in domestic affairs is well documented. The UN 
"interventions" in Korea, Hungary, the Congo (ONUC), Cyprus (UNFI-
CYP), Vietnam, Tibet, Hong Kong and Macao were thus strongly con-
demned by the PRC as contraventions of the Charter's principles.28 
As indicated, Chinese resistance to encroachments on state sover-
eignty have also been reflected in its qualified approach to human rights 
as an international concern. Most notably, the PRC has never endorsed 
the UN General Assembly Universal Declaration of Human Rights nor 
has it become a party to the International Convention on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights. Chinese accession to the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (on 29 December 1981) and the PRC vote 
in support of General Assembly resolutions that condemned torture on 
the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Convenant on Civil and Political Rights and other internationally articu-
lated standards29 are seen as the exception rather than the rule in this 
respect.30 
In seeking to reinforce the traditional legal doctrine of sovereignty, 
the PRC has not confined itself to negative measures, but has also ac-
tively pursued positive strategies. Prominent in this category have been 
the steps taken to promote the principles of peaceful co-existence 
adopted at the Bandung Conference in 1955.31 The PRC has also incorpo-
rated references to these principles in many of its international agree-
ments and statements, including those made by Premier Zhao Ziyang 
during Prime Minister Thatcher's visit to China in September 1982. Mr. 
Zhao took the opportunity to reiterate the relevance of the principles as a 
basis for problem-solving in the context of Sino-British relations.32 The 
27. See documents and discussions in the second volume of 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra 
note 23, at 1322-61 (1974). 
28. Id. 
29. G.A. Res. 3059, 28 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/PV 2163 (1973); G.A. Res. 3218, 29 
U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/9031 (1974). 
30. Some possible explanations for this uncharacteristic step are referred to — but not 
given credence to — by Cohen, Reflection on the Criminal Process in China, 68 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 323, 353-4 (1977). 
31. Five principles of peaceful co-existence were expressly agreed to by India and the 
PRC in the Preamble of the Treaty of Tibet signed in Peking on April 29, 1954. These were: 
(1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual non-
aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other's affairs; (4) equality and mutual bene-
fit; and (5) peaceful co-existence. A year later in Bandung, Indonesia, the Asian Conference 
expanded the list to ten principles. 
32. Two principles emphasized in relation to Hong Kong were the assertion of sover-
eignty over territory on the basis of historic — particularly precolonial — claims, and the 
principle that existing treaties were invalid because of their "unequal" character. Reported 
in the South China Morning Post, Sept. 24, 1982, at p. 1; Asian Wall Street Journal, Sept. 
24, 1982, at p. 1. 
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unyielding Chinese position on the issue of sovereignty had also been ap-
parent throughout the negotiations by the two parties and is mirrored in 
the agreement itself. 
On the British side, of course, the claim to sovereignty over the terri-
tory has always been implicit in the factual and legal circumstances of 
Hong Kong. It may easily be inferred from the constitutional and legal 
practices adopted by the UK for governing the territory.33 The PRC, on 
the other hand, has consistently emphasized that although the UK has de 
facto control over Hong Kong, it does not accept any British claim to 
permanent possession or sovereignty. There have been many official and 
semi-official statements to this effect. For example, the Chinese ambassa-
dor to the UN, in an address to the Chairman of the Special Committee 
on Colonialism seeking to remove Hong Kong and Macao from the list of 
territories falling within the Committee's terms of reference, stated that: 
". . . Hong Kong and Macao are part of Chinese territory occupied by 
the British and Portuguese authorities. The settlement of the questions 
of Hong Kong and Macao is entirely within China's sovereign right and 
does not at all fall under the ordinary category of colonial territories 
"34 
This, again, highlights the distinctive attitude of the PRC with re-
gard to sovereignty. As a leading Hong Kong commentator observed, al-
though the Chinese request was successful, that in itself did not indicate 
the acceptance by UN members of the claim that the Hong Kong ques-
tion rested exclusively within China's jurisdiction.38 Indeed, many of 
those members have treaty relations and other interests with the UK with 
respect to Hong Kong. 
It may be argued that the notion of "divided sovereignty," which is a 
recognized norm of international law,36 could have been applied to the 
sovereignty of Hong Kong by the PRC. Such a concept is employed to 
describe a state of affairs whereby the sum total of powers accorded by 
international law to a soverign state are exercised in respect of a territory 
by two or more states. Thus the UK, which clearly exercised in Hong 
Kong the kind of extensive powers that are the principal attributes of 
territorial sovereignty, may be said to possess what O'Connell calls "effec-
tive" sovereignty while China may be deemed to have the "titular" or 
"residual" sovereignty (i.e., the ultimate power to dispose of the 
territory).37 
33. Dicks, supra note 16, at 437-39. On the constitutional structure of Hong Kong in 
general and a useful list of references, see Wesley-Smith, Hong Kong, in CONSTITUTIONS OF 
DEPENDENCIES AND SPECIAL SOVEREIGNTIES (A. Blaustein & E. Blautsein eds. 1985). 
34. 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 23, at 384. 
35. Dicks, supra note 16, at 436 n.28. 
36. O'CONNELL, supra note 19, at ch. 10. 
37. Id. 
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A. Hong Kong's Status under the Laws of the PRC 
Notwithstanding the Chinese concept of an indivisible sovereignty,38 
in practice the PRC has treated the Hong Kong government as the lawful 
government of the territory.39 Among many examples, China extends rec-
ognition to foreign consular representatives who are accredited by the 
British government in Hong Kong.40 The PRC has not expressed any mis-
givings about the fact that the UK has consistently concluded bilateral 
and multilateral agreements on behalf of Hong Kong and represented the 
territory and its inhabitants in relation to third states. The Chinese au-
thorities have also acknowledged the right of the UK to issue currency in 
Hong Kong (one of the most important attributes of sovereignty). Fur-
thermore, for certain administrative and economic purposes the PRC leg-
islation treats Hong Kong as a separate territory and the boundary be-
tween Hong Kong and China as an international frontier. Finally, the 
PRC also recognizes many legal and judicial acts which have taken effect 
under the law of Hong Kong, including, marriages, divorces, inheritances, 
incorporation and registration of companies. As might be expected, how-
ever, references to Hong Kong in Chinese legislation are made in such a 
way as to exclude any implication that the territory falls within the cate-
gory of foreign states.41 
The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Future of Hong Kong 
gives concrete expression to both the narrow conception of sovereignty on 
the part of the PRC and its proclivity towards pragmatism in approach-
ing problems at the tactical level. It is also an attempt to reconcile the 
conflicting notions of sovereignty held by the Chinese and British govern-
ments. Thus, the Chinese declare their decision to "resume the exercise of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong," whereas the British declare that they will 
"restore Hong Kong to the PRC". The pragmatic solution offered by the 
contracting parties, within the parameters set by China, is to accord the 
territory a quasi-autonomous status while reintegrating it into the PRC. 
Specifically, Section I of Annex I stipulates that the Hong Kong SAR 
"shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy," except in foreign and defense 
affairs which will be the responsibility of the Central People's Govern-
ment. According to the agreement, the Hong Kong SAR will be vested 
with "executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including 
that of final adjudication."42 It "will retain the status of a free port and a 
38. Accord, Ch'in Fu, Restoring Hong Kong is Perfectly Valid in International Law, 4 
J. INT'L STUDIES 3, 3-8 (Kit-yee Cheng trans. 1983). 
39. Dicks, The Position of Hong Kong and Macao in Recent Chinese Legislation, 4 
HONG KONG L. J. 151 (May 1974). 
40. Id. For a full account, see Dicks, supra note 16, at 439-41. 
41. See, e.g., Interim Regulations on Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Repub-
lic of China, art. 8 (1980) in which Hong Kong is listed seperately from Macao in a way that 
indicates it is not a "foreign" country. Reprinted in 1 FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS, CHINA'S 
FOREIGN ECONOMIC LEGISLATION 118-38 (1980). 
42. The Draft Agreement, art. 3(3), supra note 1, at 1371. 
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separate customs territory"43 and will continue to serve as an interna-
tional financial center with its foreign exchange markets, free flow of capi-
tal and convertible currency.44 The agreement also envisages for the Hong 
Kong SAR a quasi-autonomous status with respect to finances and 
taxes,48 as well as a capacity to participate in relevant international orga-
nizations and international trade agreements.46 
The formula of "one country, two systems" is the vehicle by which 
the PRC seeks to exercise its sovereignty over Hong Kong and at the 
same time ensure the territory's prosperity and stability. This novel 
scheme is by no means perceived as a restriction on Chinese sovereignty 
since no concessions are granted to any other power. Rather, it is a form 
of domestic delegation of power, broadly similar to that extended to vari-
ous sub-national entities (e.g., special economic zones) and in line with 
Article 31 of the Constitution of the PRC which provides that "[t]he state 
may establish special administrative regions when necessary."47 
A rather idealistic interpretation of the "one country, two systems" 
concept is furnished by Yan Ziaqui, who considers it as a viable model for 
solving certain types of international conflicts by peaceful means. He con-
tends that within this flexible framework Hong Kong would in fact wield 
more power than member states in federal countries, and thereby deduces 
that the proposed national configuration is vastly superior to any feasible 
alternative.48 
Opposing interpretations support the view that the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration affords no solid foundation for Hong Kong's future as a 
quasi-autonomous legal entity. Five arguments have been raised by Chiu 
in an article which constitutes the first critical scrutiny of the document 
by an international legal scholar.49 
The most glaring threat to the "durability and credibility" of Hong 
Kong's future quasi-autonomy identified by Chiu, lies in the fact that 
both the legislative and interpretative powers of the Basic Law for the 
Territory are in the hands of the PRC's National People's Congress 
(NPC). Here, Section I, Paragraph 1 of Annex I of the Joint Declaration 
stipulates that the NPC "shall enact and promulgate a Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong SAR of the PRC" and, in addition, under Article 67 of the 
Chinese Constitution the Standing Committee of the NPC has the power 
to interpret the Constitution and those political bodies governed by it. 
The corollary is that the Basic Law will be subject to interpretation by 
43. Id. art. 3(6), at 1372. 
44. Id. art. 3(7). 
45. Id. art. 3(8). 
46. Id. art. 3(9). 
47. FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS, T H E CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(1983)[hereinafter cited as T H E CHINESE CONSTITUTION]. 
48. Yan Ziaqui, Concept Points to Reunification, 14 Beijing Rev. 22, 22-23 (Apr. 1985). 
49. Chiu, The 1984 Sino-British Agreement on Hong Kong and its Implications on 
China's Unification, 21 ISSUES & STUD. 13, 17-19 (Apr. 1985). 
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the same external body which endorses the Constitution. 
The second argument regarding Hong Kong's future quasi-autonomy 
pertains to a statement in the Joint Declaration which provides that the 
"law previously in force in Hong Kong . . . shall be maintained save for 
any that contravene the Basic Law . . . ."B0 Given the fact that under the 
Chinese Constitution the Standing Committee of the NPC has the right 
to "interpret statutes," the laws of Hong Kong may be subject to annul-
ment by this body, on the ground, real or otherwise, that they contravene 
the Basic Law.51 
Chiu's third argument is an extension of the second. He points out 
that the Chinese Constitution authorizes the Standing Committee of the 
NPC "to annul those local regulations or decisions of the organs of state 
power of. . . autonomous regions. . . that contravene the Constitution, 
the Statutes or the administrative rules and regulations," thus imposing 
further potential contraints on the legislative power of the Hong Kong 
legislature.52 
Another possible threat to Hong Kong's future quasi-autonomy is in-
herent in the Chinese Constitution which entitles the State Council "to 
alter or annul inappropriate decisions and orders issued by local organs of 
state administration at different levels."53 This may render the executive 
organ in the territory vulnerable to administrative interference from 
structurally higher levels of government within the PRC. 
The last argument advanced by Chiu focuses on the decisive role to 
be played by China in the appointment of the Chief Executive of the 
Hong Kong SAR.54 While prior local election or consultation are envis-
aged, it is questionable to what extent a measure of independence would 
be retained in the face of control by the Central People's Government. 
Chiu's arguments, while not groundless, are open to counter-argu-
ments. To begin with, the question of the interpretation of the Basic Law 
has not yet been authoritatively resolved and it is conceivable that an 
arrangement will allow the local courts to exercise this function, at least 
with respect to "purely" internal matters.55 Indeed, even within China 
proper, the Standing Committee of the NPC is no longer the sole author-
ity relied upon to interpret the Constitution and related legislation, for 
50. The Draft Agreement, annex I, § II, para. 1, supra note 1, at 1373. 
51. THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION, supra note 47, art. 67, para. 4. 
52. Id. art. 67, para. 8. 
53. Id. art. 8, para. 14. 
54. The Draft Agreement, annex I, § I, para. 3, supra note 1, at 1373. 
55. According to a delegation of local lawyers who recently returned from China, Hong 
Kong courts will be granted the "judicial power" of interpreting the Basic Law in deciding 
cases after 1997, whereas the NPC will retain the "legislative power of interpretation," 
namely, the power to amplify laws by legislative edict. It should be noted that Hong Kong, 
being a common law jurisdiction, based on the doctrine of precedent, exercises a judicial 
power of interpretation. The PRC on the other hand, follows a system whereby the power of 
interpretation rests with the legislature and has to be laid down in laws. 
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some of this responsibility has recently been delegated to subordinate 
bodies.66 Furthermore, it should be noted that the Standing Committee of 
the NPC seldom makes use of its interpretative powers and consequently 
those powers do not constitute a real threat under normal circumstances. 
It is also becoming increasingly evident that Hong Kong will be given 
the opportunity to provide a tangible input into the drafting of the Basic 
Law, rather than having the document imposed upon it in a one-sided 
fashion. To the extent that the Basic Law will serve as a legal framework 
for the territory, the role of the Standing Committee of the NPC in shap-
ing this framework can be defined in "duopolistic," instead of "monopo-
listic" terms. 
The relationship between the Basic Law and municipal legislation is 
another domain in which a more sanguine outlook is warranted. Arguably, 
the Basic Law could merely replace the existing Letters Patent and the 
local courts will retain their formal power to declare laws as ultra vires to 
the supreme constitutional documents. 
The third point raised by Chiu is the consequence of misreading the 
Chinese Constitution. Given the restricted meaning accorded to "autono-
mous regions" under Chapter 3, Section VI of the Constitution, it should 
not be seen as applying to special administrative regions such as Hong 
Kong. As the Chinese Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationali-
ties confirms, "autonomous regions" are designed to enjoy less autonomy 
than the special administrative category.87 
A similar observation may be made with respect to the putative con-
stitutional power of the State Council to review measures taken by "local 
organs of state administration." Local organs are dealt with under special 
provisions of the Chinese Constitution (Chapter 3, Section V), which 
seem not to encompass the special administrative region phenomenon. It 
may also be added that any State Council intervention in the internal 
affairs of Hong Kong could be construed as an infringement of the Sino-
56. According to a resolution on Strengthening the Work on Statutory Interpretation 
adopted by the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's congress at the 19th 
Meeting of the Standing Committee on June 10,1981, the following bodies are authorized to 
interpret the laws, in addition to the NPC's Standing Committee: the Supreme People's 
Court (to provide explanations on questions relating to the concrete application of the law 
in the courts' adjudicatory work); the Supreme People's Procuratorate (to provide explana-
tions on questions relating to the concrete application of laws in procuratorial work); the 
State Council (to provide explanations on questions relating to the concrete application of 
laws which are not within adjudicatory or procuratorial work); the Provincial People's Con-
gresses (to interpret and clarify or supplement local regulations made by them); and the 
Provincial Peoples Government (to provide explanations on questions relating to the con-
crete application of local regulations). COLLECTION OF LAWS (1981) (translated from Chinese 
by Albert Chen). 
57. The Law on the Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities was adopted in the 
Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress on May 23, 1984. See Chen, Further 
Aspects of the Autonomy of Hong Kong Under the PRC Constitution, 14 HONG KONG L. J. 
341, 345-7 (1984). 
1986 CHINESE RULE IN HONG KONG 183 
British Joint Declaration and presumably the Basic Law. 
Chiu's final point is perhaps the most valid from a procedural stand-
point. It is clear that, unlike states in a federal country, Hong Kong 
would not be able to freely elect its Chief Executive. Yet, the formal ar-
rangement envisaged under the terms of the Sino-British Joint Declara-
tion provides the Central People's Government with a weaker control 
mechanism than Chiu implies. Specifically, it provides for a veto power 
rather than the direct positive power of appointment. 
In the final analysis, Hong Kong's future as a separate entity hinges 
on the willingness and ability of the PRC to treat it as such and, to a 
lesser degree, on its own willingness and ability to contribute towards this 
goal. As stated previously, China is not inclined to allow legal constraints 
to impede its policies and neither the Sino-British Joint Declaration nor 
the Basic Law should be deemed as the principal variables likely to deter-
mine the extent of local autonomy. Needless to say, the success of the 
"one country, two systems" formula also depends on the recognition and 
support of third parties. 
B. The Role of the PRC 
Of these imponderable factors, Chinese willingness to grant Hong 
Kong a high measure of autonomy is the most difficult to analyze. It is 
not easy to draw inferences about attitudes prevailing within the PRC's 
hermetically closed system of policy-making and, to compound matters, 
one is often left with the impression that this rather chaotic system is 
inherently incapable of formulating coherent long-term policies.88 The 
constant shifts in policy and the dialectical ambivalence of the statements 
accompanying them, belie the claims that firm societal steering and con-
trol are a feature of post-Mao decision-making in China. 
Short-term intentions, nonetheless, are open to informed speculation. 
It appears that the PRC is contemplating a more limited form of delega-
tion of power than the most favourable reading of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration would suggest. The type of autonomy envisaged could be best 
described as "controlled" or "guided autonomy", which is a configuration 
entailing a subtle command relationship between the Beijing center and 
the Hong Kong periphery. 
Chinese intentions in this respect rest on a number of assumptions 
which are presently valid, but may, of course, prove invalid through the 
course of time. The PRC is assuming that the form of authoritarian con-
trol, as exercised by the colonial government, can be substituted by an-
other without unduly affecting the prosperity and stability of the terri-
tory (a goal to which the PRC is committed to for reasons of self-
interest).69 Still, the Chinese have not completely realized that the au-
58. Until 1972, the only published legislative texts available outside of the PRC were in 
1966. Dicks, supra note 39, at 152. 
59. Hong Kong provides, regularly, about one-third of China's hard currency earnings 
184 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 14:2-3 
thoritarianism practiced by the colonial government is coupled with a 
wide array of freedoms which underpin prosperity and stability. These 
freedoms, which give economic agents the kind of extensive choices that 
are conducive to utility maximizing behavior, are apparently an anathema 
to the PRC. 
The Chinese authorities, who are increasingly inclined to learn from 
experience,60 may become aware of the tradeoff between rigid control, 
prosperity and stability. Under such circumstances, they might be willing 
to moderate the strong emphasis on control and bring the intentions at-
tributed to them more in line with local expectations of prosperity and 
stability. Sensitivity towards the interests of third parties, particularly 
those of the United States and Japan, could have a similarly beneficial 
effect.61 
The PRC may also prove reasonably sympathetic to Hong Kong's as-
pirations so long as the Taiwan issue remains unresolved. Until now, the 
Nationalist dominated island has flatly rejected all Chinese overtures for 
reunification, and the PRC is militarily too weak to impose its will by 
force in the foreseeable future. While China has not relaxed its iron grip 
over "autonomous" Tibet,62 it may in the future display a more accommo-
dating attitude towards Hong Kong with a view to signalling unequivo-
cally to Taiwan that reunification need not adversely affect the latter's 
freedoms and way of life. 
Greater willingness, however, on the part of the PRC to tolerate an 
autonomous Hong Kong may not be matched by its ability to achieve this 
in practice. The limitations of the central decision-making apparatus in 
China lie in deficient policy implementation, as well as inadequate policy 
formulation. The commands emanating from Beijing are often distorted 
in the process of top-down communication.63 The temptation to gain con-
trol over Hong Kong, and the enormous personal benefits which may be 
derived therefrom, could motivate cadres assigned to the territory to 
tighten the grip over the local polity, irrespective of the original inten-
tions of Beijing. The wide cultural gap between these cadres and the ter-
ritory's strategic elites may further exacerbate the situation by creating 
mistrust, tension and conflict. 
Indeed, the potential for conflict extends beyond the territorial con-
fines of Hong Kong. Given the disparity in the standard of living and 
and serves as its offshore financial and information center. Jao, Hong Kong's Role in Fi-
nancing China's Modernization, in CHINA AND HONG KONG: THE ECONOMIC NEXUS 1 (A. 
Youngston ed. 1983). 
60. See, e.g., POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE POST-MAO ERA (D. Lampton ed. 1986). 
61. O'Leary, China's Foreign Relations in CHINA SINCE THE "GANG OF FOUR" 231-274 
(B. Brugger ed. 1980); CHINA'S ECONOMIC REFORMS (Lin Wei & A. Chao eds. 1982); MODERN-
IZING CHINA (A. Barnett & R. Clough eds. 1986). 
62. See, e.g., S. CLOUD, AUTONOOM TIBET (1983). 
63. See, e.g., Lampton, supra note 60. 
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values between the PRC and its capitalist enclave,64 ill will might develop 
and undermine the vision of autonomy reflected in the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration. Factions in the Communist Party which are not well dis-
posed towards the "one country, two systems" formula and the overall 
modernization drive in China could exert a particularly disruptive influ-
ence in this respect.65 
On the positive side, however, it should be noted that a continuing 
commitment on the part of the PRC to rapid economic growth through 
the liberalization of the economy66 might work to the advantage of an 
autonomous Hong Kong. A liberalized economy generally breeds decen-
tralization and the territory could be in a better position to avoid rigid 
central controls in a decentralized environment consisting of multiple 
control points. The question, of course, is whether China is likely to have 
progressed far enough, if at all, along the liberalization/decentralization 
path by 1997. 
The substantial developmental gap between Hong Kong and the 
PRC, while problematic in most respects, also has a positive dimension. 
The fragile policy-making machinery in China could come to rely partly 
on its sophisticated Hong Kong counterpart for a wide range of informa-
tional inputs. Since information is an important source of power, this po-
tential asymmetry of the relationship should marginally widen the scope 
of maneuvers available to local decision-makers. 
C. The Role of Hong Kong 
The balance of the "one country, two systems" formula for autonomy 
hinges on the willingness and ability of Hong Kong to play its part in the 
scheme envisaged, as well as PRC cooperation. Unlike many other former 
colonies, the territory is endowed with a remarkable wealth of talent and 
abundant economic resources. Yet, questions arise about the long-term 
commitment of both the human capital and financial assets to Hong 
Kong, and the determination of the territory to administer itself effec-
tively in the face of potential Chinese heavy-handedness. 
Empirical evidence on this subject is scarce, but there are indications 
that Hong Kong's economic elites and professional classes have little de-
64. According to studies by the World Bank, China's nominal income per capita is only 
one-thirteenth that of Hong Kong, and the average annual growth rate of Hong Kong's GDP 
per capita is nearly twice that of China. For documentation and analysis of the economic 
gap between Hong Kong and China, see Jao, Hong Kong's Economic Prospects After the 
Sino-British Agreement: A Preliminary Assessment 51-2 (April 24-27, 1985) (unpublished 
manuscript presented to the Annual Meeting of the Western Social Science Association). 
65. See, e.g., L. PYE, THE DYNAMICS OF CHINESE POLITICS (1981). 
66. See generally, the following articles in Vol. 10 of CHINA Q. (Dec. 1984): Yeh, 
Macroeconomic Changes in the Chinese Economy During the Readjustment, at 691; Field, 
Changes in Chinese Industry Since 1978, at 742; Walker, Chinese Agriculture during the 
Period of Readjustment 1978-83, at 783; Kueh & Howe, China's International Trade; 
Lardy, Consumption and Living Standards in China, 1978-83, at 849. 
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sire to live under communist sovereignty and are actively exploring the 
"exit" option.87 While the territory could eventually generate new valua-
ble human and financial resources, the short and medium-term effects of 
large-scale migration will manifest itself in a diminished capacity for self-
government and less incentive for the PRC to allow substantive 
autonomy. 
Hong Kong is now in a process of developing its representative insti-
tutions.68 These institutions, if allowed to mature, could theoretically 
serve as a barrier to excessive Chinese intervention, although fears have 
been expressed that they might give rise to polarization of the commu-
nity, and hence immobilism. The extent to which the PRC leadership, 
with its proclivity towards "backdoor politics," would be inclined to en-
courage the partial democratization of Hong Kong is impossible to assess 
accurately.69 However, one cannot dismiss the possibility of a Chinese at-
tempt at far-reaching infiltration and domination. A significant number 
of influential PRC decision-makers still cling to the view that direct con-
trols are preferable to indirect ones, in spite of evidence that the latter 
are more effective.70 A decision to implement direct control over Hong 
Kong might sap the territory's vitality, and seriously detract from its will-
ingness and ability to govern itself. 
D. The Role of Third Parties 
The position to be adopted by third parties is another significant fac-
tor in assessing the prospects of an autonomous Hong Kong. The Sino-
British Joint Declaration has been received with much rhetorical ap-
proval from members of the international community. Eventually, how-
ever, self-interest might prevail and support for the thriving economic en-
tity from actual and potential competitors could wane and turn into open 
obstruction. The rising tide of protectionism is a particularly ominous de-
velopment on the horizon of the Hong Kong SAR.71 
67. I. Scott, The Sino British Agreement and Political Power in Hong Kong (Apr. 19, 
1985)(unpublished manuscript presented to the workshop on The Future of Hong Kong, 
University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre on Modern East Asia). 
68. See Green Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in 
Hong Kong (July 1985); White Paper: The Further Development of Government in Hong 
Kong (Nov. 1984) The reforms basically aim at developing a quasi-parlimentary democracy 
based largely on indirect elections. For a thorough analysis and critique of the changes in 
Hong Kong's political and administrative structure, see SIU-KAI LAU, POLITICAL REFORM AND 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN HONG KONG: DILEMMAS AND CHOICES (1984). 
69. See SUI-KAI LAU, supra note 68; G. Hicks, Hong Kong on the Event of Communist 
Rule 19-26 (April 24-27, 1985)(unpublished manuscript presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the Western Social Science Association); Walden, Hong Kong Chases a Democratic Mirage, 
Asian Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1985, at 6. 
70. See Salinger, supra note 14, at 1238. 
71. Thus, in view of the fact that textile and clothing industries account for about 41 
percent of Hong Kong's total industrial workforce, and 40 percent of its total domestic ex-
ports, any attempt by an importing country to abolish Hong Kong's independent quota (and 
merge it with that of China's) would have serious repercussions and could well be disas-
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Nevertheless, the attitude of third parties toward the Territory could 
have a positive influence on the PRC. If China is genuinely committed to 
maintaining Hong Kong's prosperity and stability, it must respect its sta-
tus as a separate economic entity, otherwise international recognition 
might be withheld.72 The territory's external predicament can thus be 
viewed both as a threat to its envisaged independence and as a con-
straining factor upon the PRC. 
From a broad legal standpoint, changing notions of sovereignty 
should facilitate the recognition of Hong Kong's status as an international 
legal person by the international community. Given the fact that states 
now tend to admit non-state actors, such as international organizations 
and multinational corporations, into the international legal system, legiti-
mate expectations have been created for extending a similar recognition 
to autonomous regions which enjoy a particularly high degree of interna-
tional exposure. It is possible to draw analogies here with other configura-
tions recognized in international law,73 such as federal states (e.g., Basque 
country, Catalonia, Eritrea, Greenland, United Arab Emirates), interna-
tionalized territories and territories of particular international concern 
(e.g., the Free City of Danzig, the Free Territory of Trieste, the Interna-
tional Settlement of Shanghai, the Memel territory), associated states 
(e.g., Cook Islands, Niu, Puerto Rico, Toklau) and "unincorporated terri-
tories" (e.g., Guam, Netherlands Antilles, U.S. Virgin Islands). An analy-
sis of these configurations suggests that the degree of international legal 
personality accorded is the function of three factors: control over (na-
tional) defense, control over foreign relations and competence to enter 
into international agreements, with or without the consent of the central/ 
sovereign government.74 The greater the freedom exercised in the above 
domains, the more likely is the recognition of a dependent territory as a 
discrete entity with a measure of international legal personality. 
While the conduct of foreign affairs remains the most conspicuous 
symbol of sovereign power, the conduct of economic exchanges with other 
national entities, for all practical purposes, acquired greater significance.75 
On this basis, the considerable formal power to be retained under the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration by the Hong Kong SAR in relation to 
"transnational or external affairs" (as distinct from "foreign affairs" 
which encompass basically national security and territorial integrity) 
should be granted due international recognition.76 The Sino-British agree-
terous if such a tactic was widely followed. See Kayser Sung, Trading On from 1997, with 
Special Reference to Hong Kong's Textile Agreements, in STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 305-
24. 
72. See Jao, Hong Kong's Economic Prospects, in STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 49. 
73. See generally, Hanum & Lillich, The Concept of Autonomy in International Law, 
in MODELS OF AUTONOMY 215 (Y. Dinstein ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as AUTOMONY]. 
74. Id. at 232-6. 
75. See generally id. 
76. This distinction has been raised and developed by Yiu Chu Liu in a paper on the 
Scope of Foreign and Defense Affairs, presented to the Future of Hong Kong Study Group 
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ment stipulates that "the Hong Kong SAR may on its own maintain and 
develop economic and trade relations with all states and regions."77 Of 
particular importance are the provisions granting to Hong Kong the au-
thority to determine its own fiscal policy, manage its financial resources 
and monetary system, regulate international travel and commerce, emi-
gration and immigration, exercise control over importation of foreign 
goods and flow of capital, maintain and develop cultural relations, and 
conclude relevant agreements with states, regions and international orga-
nizations. Thus, it appears that under the agreement China, in effect, re-
tains a residual power which is "nothing more than that part of the SAR's 
transnational or external relations which cannot be conducted by the 
SAR in the name of 'Hong Kong, China' due to the SAR not being a 
nation-state."78 
From a legal standpoint the residual power determined through the 
the text of the agreement cannot be the exclusive determinant of the bal-
ance of power between the central and local authorities.79 This point finds 
judicial expression through the Permanent Court of International Justice 
in the Interpretation of the Statute of Memel Case*0 and the Lighthouse 
in Crete and Samos Case.81 As may be inferred from both judgments, 
notwithstanding any autonomy arrangement and regardless of the extent 
of power transferred, sovereignty of the central government is not dimin-
ished and its residual power "may prove to be of tremendous importance 
when the matter is put to the test."82 
The above observation should not detract from the local entity's 
claim to recognition as an international legal person. Given the current 
emphasis on the ability and effectiveness of the self-governing institu-
tions,83 the Hong Kong SAR has a strong claim for recognition in this 
respect. Obviously, its case could gain widespread support from a Chinese 
declaration to that effect in the UN. Such a step seems, however, unlikely 
at this juncture since the PRC has resisted all along any attempt to inter-
nationalize the issue of Hong Kong. Hong Kong's claim for autonomy can 
be enhanced by third parties' attitude. At present, it appears that most 
other parties would be prepared to contribute to the maintenance of 
Hong Kong's unique status as an autonomous entity. Yet, as indicated, 
their position may undergo a radical change in the future. This is why 
prompt action by Hong Kong in this matter is essential. By securing early 
recognition of the territory's international personality by other relevant 
on May 29, 1985. 
77. The Draft Agreement, art. 3(10), supra note 1, at 1372. 
78. Liu, supra note 76. 
79. Dinstein, Autonomy, in AUTONOMY, supra note 73, at 291, 296. 
80. Interpretation of the Statute of Memel Territory (Merits), 1932 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, 
no. 49, at 35 (Hudson ed. 1938). 
81. Lighthouse in Crete and Samos, 1937 P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, no. 71, at 243 (Hudson ed. 
1943). 
82. Dinstein, supra note 79, at 300. 
83. Hannum & Lillich, supra note 73, at 250-1. 
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external actors, Hong Kong could, with the assistance of the UK, render 
subsequent reversals less likely. 
V. THE ISSUE OF TREATIES 
A. The PRC Concept of Treaties 
Treaties are the major instruments for facilitating interactions within 
the international legal system. They are also an important source of inter-
national law, creating norms of international law and establishing obliga-
tions and rights of contracting parties. By concluding a treaty, the con-
tracting parties apply the most significant norm of customary 
international law,84 namely the rule of pacta sunt servanda (treaties must 
be observed), which in fact is the underlying rationale of the binding 
quality of treaty obligations. 
It is interesting to note that this principle is hailed by the PRC 
which, like other communist countries, deems treaties as the primary 
source of international law.86 It should be observed, however, that China 
only regards "just" or "equal" treaties as legitimate sources of interna-
tional law. Generally, the PRC considers as "unequal" all treaties im-
posed on China in the 19th and early 20th centuries (i.e., those concern-
ing consular jurisdiction, unilateral most-favored nation treatment, 
restrictive tariff regulations, territorial cessions or leases, including the 
treaties relating to Hong Kong).86 While the treaties alluded to involved 
many instances of extreme inequality, both in terms of the bargaining 
power of the parties and the benefits and burdens created by the treaties 
themselves, other treaties exist which are to all appearances acceptable to 
the PRC. Nevertheless, such treaties undertaken by the parties cannot be 
described as truly "equal" and consequently, the meaning of "unequal 
treaty" remains obscure.87 
Students of Chinese politics have contended that "political consider-
ations, apparently more frequently than legal ones, motivate the PRC in 
the application of the [unequal treaty] concept" and that the Chinese 
have conveniently constructed a legal machinery "in order to extricate 
themselves from difficult, or unmitigable situations."88 With reference to 
these critical comments, Scott remarks that "this does nothing to set the 
PRC apart from other states which may be champions of the Western 
84. The rule is restated in article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which provides that "every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 
23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 
Vienna Convention]. 
85. For a discussion and further references, see G. SCOTT, supra note 12, at 59-61. 
86. HUNGDAH CHIU, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 60-71 
(1972). See also W.L. TUNG, CHINA AND FOREIGN POWERS: T H E IMPACT OF AND REACTION TO 
UNEQUAL TREATIES (1970). 
87. G. SCOTT, supra note 12, at 92-6. 
88. Id. at 96-7. 
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system of international law"89 and that Western states also often use in-
ternational law merely to cloak otherwise questionable acts in a mantle of 
legality. Scott identifies what he perceives to be a "politically parallel 
concept in Western international law," namely, rebus sic stantibus. This 
concept, which is incorporated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties,90 allows termination of or withdrawal from a treaty where 
there has been a "fundamental change of circumstances." Scott maintains 
that the rebus sic stantibus clause often becomes the basis for politically 
motivated change in the status quo. 
The unequal treaty concept, while enjoying support among third 
world countries, cannot be said to have gained general acceptance as a 
rule of international law. The Law of Treaties,91 to which China has not 
acceded, goes no further than to stipulate that a treaty shall be void if 
procured by force contrary to the principles of international law embod-
ied in the UN Charter.92 There is no reference to economic inequality in 
bargaining power, which the PRC appears to include in its doctrine of 
unequal treaties.93 Nor are the equality or inequality of obligations as-
sumed by the parties taken into account in regulating treaties. Attention 
should be drawn, to the non-binding Declaration on the Prohibition of 
Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, 
adopted by the Vienna Treaty Conference,94 which "solemnly condemns 
the threat or use of pressure in any form, whether military, political, or 
economic by any state in order to coerce another state to perform any act 
relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of the 
sovereign equality of states and the freedom of consent." 
The divergence between Western and Chinese views on "unequal 
treaties" has clearly manifested itself with regard to Hong Kong. While 
the PRC deems the treaties relating to the acquisition of Hong Kong as 
unequal and hence null and void,96 the UK has asserted that the doctrine 
amounts to no more than a political principle which may justify a moral 
condemnation of historical events but has no binding legal effect.96 In any 
event, the debate concerning the relative strength of the respective claims 
by the two sides must now be relegated to the academic realm. The more 
pertinent question is whether the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the 
future of Hong Kong constitutes a valid international treaty which is 
binding on the contracting parties. This question has attracted considera-
ble attention on the part of general commentators, without the emergence 
89. Id. at 97. 
90. 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 84. 
91. Id. 
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 52. 
93. HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 86. 
94. The declaration is annexed to the Final Act of the United Nations Conference on 
the Law of Treaties. 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 84, at 733. 
95. See P. WESLEY-SMITH, UNEQUAL TREATY 1898-1997: CHINA, GREAT BRITAIN AND 
HONG KONG'S NEW TERRITORIES (1980). 
96. See Dicks, supra note 16, at 434-5. 
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of a clear consensus. 
B. The Validity of the Joint Declaration 
On balance, the position held that the agreement is a valid interna-
tional treaty has greater merit, insofar as formal aspects of treaty making 
are concerned. This conclusion rests on the fact that the Joint Declara-
tion falls within the established definition of an international treaty as 
incorporated in Article 2 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. This definition equates a treaty with "an international agree-
ment concluded between states in written form and governed by interna-
tional law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more 
related instruments and whatever its particular designation."97 
Since the PRC is not a party to the 1969 Vienna Convention, it is 
important to emphasize that the above definition codifies, to a large ex-
tent, customary international law with respect to treaties.98 Chinese non-
accession to the Convention is merely a "technicality" which should have 
no direct bearing on the status of the agreement as an international 
treaty. 
Given the relevance of the definition, the designation of "Joint Dec-
laration" rather than "treaty," does not detract from its validity as an 
instrument compatible with the Convention criteria. As elaborated by 
many international authorities,99 the designation of a treaty is of no great 
significance (although it may indicate certain procedural differences or 
degrees of formality). A treaty may thus be labelled "protocol," "arrange-
ment," "statute," "declaration," "final act," "general act," etc. and enjoy 
equal international legal validity. 
The fact that the Joint Declaration consists of several documents100 
does not dilute its force as a binding international treaty. As the defini-
tion states, the number of documents is not of any relevance. Further-
more, the agreement itself stipulates that both the Joint Declaration and 
97. 1969 Vienna Convention, art. 2(a), supra note 84, at 680-1. 
98. See Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970); 
Sinclair, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 47 (1970). It is 
clear that the Convention's provisions constitute presumptive evidence of general interna-
tional law rules. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf [Germany v. Denmark and The 
Netherlands], 1969 I.C.J. 3, 13; and Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 18. In 
respect to rules concerning the termination of treaties, for example, it was confirmed by the 
International Court of Justice that they "may in many respects be considered as a codifica-
tion of existing customary law on the subject." Legal Consequences for States of the Contin-
ued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 47 (advisory op.). 
99. See, e.g., The International Law Commision's Commentary, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. 
COMM'N 188. 
100. The Draft Agreement, supra note 1, contains the Joint Declaration, three annexes 
and one exchange memoranda. It also includes a lengthy introduction on the British Gov-
ernment's position and other explanatory notes. 
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its Annexes "shall be equally binding."101 
In addition, the Sino-British Joint Declaration is the product of a 
process throughout which the contracting parties have meticulously fol-
lowed the established practices regarding treaty-making. These include 
the accreditation of persons who conducted the negotiations, negotiations 
and adoption of the text (26 September, 1984), authentication, signature 
and exchange of instruments (19 December, 1984), ratification, entry into 
force (27 May, 1985) and, finally, registration with the United Nations in 
accordance with Article 102 of the UN Charter (13 June, 1985). 
C. The Implementation of the Treaty 
It is not possible, at the present juncture, to assess the parties' exact 
intentions with respect to the final phase of the treaty-making process, 
namely, application and enforcement. This normally entails some form of 
incorporation of the treaty provisions into the domestic law of the parties 
and actual application of the provisions along with implementation of the 
administrative arrangements agreed upon. Administrative arrangements, 
in the context of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, include the establish-
ment of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group and the Land Commission, 
the details of which are provided in Annexes II and III of the Agreement. 
The application of a treaty raises the wider issue of the position of 
treaties in domestic law and, at a higher plane, that of the relationship 
between international law and municipal legislation. The British position 
in this regard mirrors the "transformation," as distinct from "incorpora-
tion," theory whereby international agreements are transformed into do-
mestic law by means of appropriate constitutional law.102 According to 
this theory, treaties cannot operate of themselves within the state but 
require the passage of enabling statutes. The Crown in the UK retains 
the right to sign and ratify international agreements, yet is unable to leg-
islate directly. Hence, before a treaty can become part of English law an 
Act of Parliament is essential.103 In line with this approach, the Hong 
Kong Act of 1985 was passed by Parliament, stating that "[a]s from 1st 
July 1997 Her Majesty shall no longer have sovereignty or jurisdiction 
over any part of Hong Kong"104 and included provisions on the three cru-
cial matters of nationality, amendments to the laws of Hong Kong and 
101. The Draft Agreement, art. 8, supra note 1, at 1372. 
102. Mann, The Enforcement of Treaties by English Courts, 44 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS 
SOC'Y 29 (1958-59). See generally A.D. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES (1961). 
103. There are three exceptions to this practice. For example, treaties relating to the 
conduct of war or to cession of territory do not need an intervening act of legislation before 
they can be made binding upon the citizens of the country. By the same token, relatively 
unimportant administrative agreements which do not require ratification also apply auto-
matically, provided of course, they do not purport to alter municipal law. Generally, how-
ever, where the rights and duties of British subjects are affected, an Act of Parliament is 
necessary to render the provisions fo the particular treaty operative within the United King-
dom. Mann, supra note 102. 
104. Hong Kong Act, ch. 15, 1985. 
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the granting of diplomatic privileges to Chinese members of the Joint Li-
aison Group.105 
The PRC doctrine on the relationship between international and do-
mestic law is rather ambiguous. The Chinese Constitution (1982) fur-
nishes no guidelines in this respect and Chinese writers seldom address 
this question. An outside expert has expressed the view that in order to 
implement a treaty in the municipal law of the PRC, laws or decrees need 
to be enacted.108 As a matter of practice, some treaties are indeed in-
cluded in China's official Collection of Laws and Regulations and pre-
sumably have the same legal status as other legislation incorporated in 
the collection. Informal discussions with scholars specializing in PRC law 
suggest, however, that the American model, which differentiates between 
"self-executing" and "non self-executing" treaties,107 is more applicable in 
China than the British "transformation" theory. Indeed, this would dove-
tail with the PRC's tendency to blur the distinction between law and 
policy. 
The PRC has undertaken the incorporation of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration into a "Basic Law," which is to be drafted by the National 
People's Congress.108 This document is intended to serve as the constitu-
tion of the Hong Kong SAR for a fifty year period following the transfer 
of sovereignty.109 The Basic Law will be regarded as the supreme legal 
instrument in the territory, providing both an overall yardstick for evalu-
ating the validity of local legislation and establishing the institutional 
framework for an autonomous Hong Kong. 
There appears to be little doubt that China will take the necessary 
formal steps to implement the Joint Declaration.110 The PRC's reasona-
bly good record of compliance with treaties lends support to this conten-
tion. As Lee has observed, China has been particularly careful in adhering 
to the provisions and meeting the obligations of its trade agreements.111 
He acknowledges that negotiations with Beijing are not an easy matter, 
but asserts that once an unambiguous agreement is reached, compliance 
normally follows.112 
105. Id. 
106. HUNGDAH Cmu, supra note 87, at 7. 
107. While the former are able to operate automatically within the domestic sphere 
without the need for any municipal legislation, the latter require enabling acts before they 
can function inside the country and within the American courts. The distinction is based on 
the political content of the treaties, such as where a political issue is involved the treaty is 
likely to be treated as non self-executing and vice versa. 
108. The Draft Agreement, art. 3, para. 12, supra note 1, at 1372. 
109. Id. 
110. The Joint Liaison Group and the Land Commission were set up on May 27, 1985 
with the respective aims of ensuring the smooth transfer of sovereignty and handling of 
related land questions. A Basic Law Drafting Committee was established on June 18, 1985. 
111. L. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: A STUDY OF COMPLIANCE 119 
(1969). 
112. Id. 
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In support of the above claim, Lee postulates that the Confucian em-
phasis on ch'eng (sincerity) and hsin (trustworthiness) seems to have 
been extended from interpersonal to interstate relations and that this 
may account for the generally satisfactory record of both the PRC and 
Nationalist China in complying with treaty commitments.113 In the case 
of the PRC, this compliance is not entirely consistent with the domestic 
law practice of elevating li over fa.11* One possible explanation for the 
inconsistency is that the good external records reflects the weakness of 
the PRC as an actor in the international arena, particularly vis-a-vis the 
superpowers.118 Another reason may lie in the Chinese sensitivity to their 
external image and the resultant tendency to differentiate between inter-
national behavior and domestic application.118 
The formal implementation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
does not appear to pose any serious problems in relation to the viability 
of the arrangements envisaged for Hong Kong. However, a more critical 
issue is that of interpretation. Given the wide disparities between the no-
tions of law prevailing on both sides, the agreement is open to conflicting 
interpretations. No procedure for solving interpretation disputes is pro-
vided under the Joint Declaration and this omission may be a source of 
considerable difficulties in view of the PRC's reluctance to submit to 
third party adjudication in the settlement of international disputes and 
its non-acceptence of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice.117 
VI. THE ISSUE OF STATE SUCCESSION 
The change of sovereignty over Hong Kong gives rise to a host of 
"succession" questions. Even though China contends that no transfer of 
sovereignty is to take place, since it is to "resume" the exercise of sover-
eignty,118 the situation effectively falls within the definition of "state suc-
cession."119 Under this definition, the replacement of one state by another 
in the responsibility for the international relations of a territory is tanta-
mount to state succession and, as such, subject to relevant international 
legal regulation. The explanatory notes to the Annexes of the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration and to the Associated Exchange of Memoranda explic-
itly refer to the imminent changes in the territory in equivalent terms.120 
Specifically, it is stated therein that "foreign and defense affairs which 
are now the overall responsibility of Her Majesty's Government . . . will 
113. Id. 
114. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
115. L. LEE, supra note 111, at 129. 
116. See generally CHINA AND THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY (J. Hsiung & S. Kim eds. 1980). 
117. HUNGDAH CHIU, supra note 49, at 15. 
118. See supra note 20-24 and accompanying text. 
119. 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, art. 2, 
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 80/31/Corr. 2, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1488 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Convention on Succession]. 
120. The Draft Agreement, supra note 1, at 1382-87. 
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with effect from 1 July 1997 become the overall responsibility of the Cen-
tral People's Government of the People's Republic of China."121 
Though the specific rules which govern state succession are not as 
unequivocal, some underlying principles may be discerned from state 
practice, judicial authorities and doctrine. Moreover, codified authority is 
present in the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect 
of Treaties122 and the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in 
Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts.123 
Whether any rights or obligations should pass upon external changes 
of sovereignty is theoretically determined by considerations of justice, 
reasonableness, equity and the interests of the international community. 
As Starke emphasizes, however, state practice in this domain is "unset-
tled and full of inconsistencies" and these have not been resolved in the 
recent conventions on succession referred to above.124 Consequently, 
states tend to deal expressly with possible succession questions within the 
context of the treaty pertaining to the transfer of sovereignty. Any subse-
quent problems are reviewed in light of the intentions of the parties, rele-
vant laws, treaties, declarations and other arrangements accompanying 
the change of sovereignty. 
The position of newly independent states is quite straightforward.125 
The emphasis here is on a modernized version of the "clean slate" the-
ory.126 As evidenced in the Vienna Conventions on Succession, and the 
discussions leading up to their conclusion, little has been allowed to dero-
gate from the right of newly independent sovereign states to decide which 
bilateral and multilateral treaties will remain in force.127 At the same 
time, the basic human desire for stability, reflected in the practice of con-
cluding devolution agreements128 and more recently the growing number 
of unilateral declarations,129 has prompted newly independent states to 
retain many of the treaties in force. 
The predicament of Hong Kong in this regard is unique, because of 
121. Id. para. 4, at 1382. 
122. Convention on Succession, supra note 119. 
123. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 117/14 (April 7, 1985), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 306 (1983). 
124. See J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 313 (9th ed. 1984). 
125. See generally OKON UDOKANG, SUCCESSION OF NEW STATES TO INTERNATIONAL 
TREATIES (1972). 
126. CHEN, STATE SUCCESSION RELATING TO UNEQUAL TREATIES 15 (1974). 
127. Convention on Succession, supra note 119. 
128. Devolution agreements provide for the "assignment" or "devolution" upon a suc-
cessor state, the treaty rights and obligations of the predecessor state. These agreements 
were used widely by many former British terrritories in order to secure succession to trea-
ties. Lawford, The Practice Concerning Treaty Succession in the Commonwealth, 1967 
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3. 
129. Unilateral Declarations, commonly utilized by Central and East African ex-British 
territories, generally provided that the treaty relationship will be maintained by the succes-
sor states for a limited period during which it will decide which treaties it wishes to retain 
indefinitely and which to discontinue. 
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the large measure of autonomy which it enjoys. The continuation of ex-
ternal ties, and hence international agreements, is the key to the terri-
tory's prosperity including the maintenance of its status as the third most 
important financial center in the world. The PRC would presumably not 
acquiesce to Hong Kong signing international agreements without author-
ity or generally acting as if it were an independent sovereign state. Thus, 
the objective, as expressed by a local government official, is to achieve 
"maximum freedom of action consistent with China's international re-
sponsibility for Hong Kong."130 The problem is compounded by the fact 
that the PRC is not a party to many of the international agreements pres-
ently applicable to the territory. Nor is China a member of many interna-
tional conferences and organizations of which Hong Kong is currently a 
member, either in its own right or as an adjunct of the British delegation 
(when meetings are confined to sovereign states alone). 
The Sino-British Joint Declaration has provided a formal mechanism 
for consolidating the territory's external links. Specifically, international 
agreements which are implemented in Hong Kong may remain with the 
Hong Kong SAR, even if China is not a party.131 One such contingency 
expressly covered in the agreement is the continued application to the 
SAR of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, not-
withstanding that the PRC is a signatory to neither.132 On the other hand, 
under the Joint Declaration, international agreements to which China is a 
party may be applied to the territory, if so decided by the Central Peo-
ple's Government, in accordance with circumstances and needs of the 
SAR Government and after seeking the latter's views. 
The technical details of treaty succession will have to be worked out 
by the Sino-British Liaison Group. The Group faces a daunting task, 
given the multitude of multilateral and bilateral treaties applicable to 
Hong Kong, and the fact that the consent of third parties must be se-
cured. Several strategies have been considered by Hong Kong officials to 
overcome this problem.133 
One strategy is to guarantee the status of a separate customs terri-
tory to the SAR and ensure its autonomous participation in international 
trade agreements such as GATT134 and MFA.136 Article XXVI 5(c) of the 
GATT stipulates that a territory which possesses "autonomy in the con-
duct of external commercial relations . . . shall, upon sponsorship 
130. Quoted in Tsang, Colossal Task of JLG to Forge a Sound Future, South China 
Morning Post, May 23, 1985, at 2. 
131. The Draft Agreement, annex I, § XI, supra note 1, at 1376-77. 
132. Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Conven-
tion on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
133. See Tsang, JLG Looks Set for a Long, Hard Slog, South China Morning Post, 
May 24, 1985, at 2. 
134. GATT, supra note 4. 
135. MFA, supra note 5. 
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through a declaration by the responsible contracting party establishing 
[the fact of its autonomy], be deemed to be a contracting party."136 Such 
a configuration should, under the optimistic assumption of third parties' 
future cooperation, serve as a model and precedent for solving similar 
issues. 
A more prudent course of action would entail the scrutiny of each 
individual treaty and the formulation of an ad hoc solution in the light of 
its specific circumstances. Such an approach may be dictated by the myr-
iad of configurations by which Hong Kong, the UK and the PRC partici-
pated in various agreements, and the conservative attitude to problem-
solving of Britain and China, although such a narrow strategy may prove 
counterproductive and inefficient in the long run. 
The most undesirable scenario is modeled on the Taiwan arrange-
ment, whereby international obligations, commercial and others, would be 
undertaken and fulfilled by the territory without its being externally rec-
ognized as an autonomous entity. Needless to say, explicit rather than 
implicit recognition is essential if Hong Kong is to continue functioning 
as a major international financial center. 
Little is known about feasible scenarios that the PRC has con-
structed for its capitalist enclave. The success of the strategies contem-
plated by the Hong Kong Government hinges primarily on Chinese atti-
tudes and behavior.137 The PRC enjoys greater leverage in its relations 
with other actors in the international arena, but it remains to be seen 
whether it would be willing and able to reconcile the conflicting domestic 
pressures and exert influence on behalf of autonomous Hong Kong in or-
der to render the succession of treaties as smooth as possible. 
Another facet of the "state succession" issue is the succession of ac-
quired private rights. International law requires that such rights be 
respected by the successor state.138 As held by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the well-known case of the German Settlers,139 
"Private rights acquired under existing law do not cease on a change of 
sovereignty." "It can hardly be maintained," declared the court, that "al-
though the law survives, private rights acquired under it have per-
ished."140 The acquired rights rule only means that change of sovereignty 
has no effect on private rights; it is not a rule for the perpetual mainte-
nance of these rights. By implication, after the transfer of sovereignty, 
the successor state may modify or even expropriate private property 
rights.141 
136. GATT, art XXVI 5(c), supra note 4. 
137. See supra Part IV(B) for a more elaborate discussion of the Chinese role. 
138. Settlers of German Origin in the Territory Ceded by Germany to Poland (Ger. v. 
Pol.), 1923 P.C.I.J. ser. B, No. 6. 
139. Id. at 36. 
140. This principle was also confirmed in Certain German Interests in Polish Upper 
Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 7. 
141. Clearly, if as a result of a change of sovereignty the possessor has acquired the 
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Insofar as the position of Hong Kong is concerned, the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration stipulates that private property will be protected by 
law,"2 that the laws which are currently in force in Hong Kong will re-
main fundamentally unchanged143 and that all rights in relation to pre-
1997 leases of land extending beyond 1997 "shall continue to be recog-
nized and protected under the law of the Hong Kong SAR."144 Yet, as 
noted above, the continuation of such rights is subject to any alterations 
made to the former municipal law by the Central Government of the 
PRC. Thus, as observed by Wesley-Smith, if Annex III concerning "Land 
Leases," is not incorporated into the Basic Law of the SAR or in any 
other legislation, "a lessee of land who is aggrieved by government action 
after 1997 will have no remedy in the courts."145 The obligations an-
nounced in the Joint Declaration would then be "obligations which want 
the vinculum juris, although binding in moral equity and conscience."146 
The SAR government would be "bound in for conscientiae to make good, 
but of which the performance is to be sought for by petition, memorial or 
remonstrance, not by action in a court of law."147 
It is hoped, therefore, that China would take the necessary steps to 
convert the provisions of the Joint Declaration into effective domestic le-
gal instruments. Indeed, the expectation is that the Basic Law might fill 
the existing gap in this respect. However, doubts are likely to persist 
about the PRC's willingness and ability to interpret the Basic Law in the 
spirit of the Joint Declaration. 
VII. THE ISSUE OF NATIONALITY 
A. The Transfer of Nationality under International Law 
International law accords states a high degree of discretion in the 
conferment of nationality. The 1930 Hague Convention on Nationality 
Laws states that "it is for each state to determine under its own law who 
are its nationals" and that "any question as to whether a person possesses 
the nationality of a particular state shall be determined in accordance 
nationality of the successor state, the rule that his rights have survived is only relevant to 
the extent to which domestic law protects them, for as a national he is at the mercy of the 
legislative powers of the successor state. See Kaeckenbeeck, The Protection of Vested 
Rights in International Law, 1936 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 17. He states that: "a cession of 
territory does not affect private rights is valid only as long as new legislation is not intro-
duced which affects them . . . . [T]he introduction of such legislation is not prohibited by 
international law, and is not in particular made by it dependent on payment of compensa-
tion." Id. 
142. The Draft Agreement, annex I, § VI, para. 1, supra note 1, at 1374. 
143. Id. annex I, § II, para. 1, at 1374. 
144. Id. annex III, art. 1, at 1380. 
145. P. Wesley-Smith, Act of State: Lord Diplock's Curious Inconsistency (unpublished 
manuscript). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
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with the laws of that state."148 Nonetheless, there are some imposed limi-
tations, such as the requirement that the nationality law of each state "be 
recognized by other states so far as it is consistent with international con-
ventions, international custom and the principles of law generally recog-
nized with regard to nationality."149 The Hague Convention, however, 
does not specify the criteria to confer nationality that are recognized or 
required by international law. 
Furthermore, any such criteria must be inferred from customary 
practice which has been limited to either or both of two major principles: 
jus sanguinis (conferment of nationality by blood relation-descent) and 
jus soli (conferment of nationality based on place of birth). It appears 
that the so called "countries of emigration" tend to emphasize jus 
sanguinis for the purpose of retaining the allegiance of descendents of 
their nationals who have settled in various parts of the world, while 
"countries of immigration" are inclined to emphasize the jus soli in order 
to have the allegiance of persons born within their territories to alien par-
ents. Traditionally, also, jus sanguinis is preferred by civil law countries 
whereas the principle of jus soli, which is an outgrowth of the feudal sys-
tem, is favored by common law countries. Presently, in most countries 
one can find the two principles employed in varying combinations.150 
Whichever of these two principles is relied upon, it is argued by Mc-
Dougal, Lasswell and Chen that most of mankind has their nationality 
thrust on them with little effective prospect for change (after all, individ-
uals cannot choose their parents or their place of birth).181 Even though 
consent is presently given greater emphasis in decisions concerning con-
ferment of nationality after birth, involuntary naturalization is quite 
common. 
McDougal and his associates have made the controversial counter-
proposition that: 
given the differential distribution of resources and opportunities for 
value shaping and sharing about the globe, the instability and fragility 
of the inherited organizations of territorial communities and the ever 
increasing mobility of people and frequency of transnational interac-
tions, every individual person should be free to effect a voluntary 
change in his nationality and thus to identify with the political com-
munity of his own choice. . . . As a matter of human rights every per-
son should be free to change his nationality.162 
148. 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of National-
ity Laws, arts. 1 & 2, April 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, reprinted in D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 555, 570 (3rd. ed. 1983). 
149. Id. 
150. Scott, Nationality: Jus Soli or Jus Sanguinis?, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 158 (1930). 
151. M. McDougal, H. Lasswell & L. Chen, Nationality and Human Rights: The Pro-
tection of the Individual in External Arenas, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT 
TO INTERNATIONAL IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 555, 570 (M. McDougal & W.M. Reisman 
eds. 1981). 
152. Id. at 578. 
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Indeed, some recognition is accorded to this notion in the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights which proclaims that "no one shall be arbitrar-
ily . . . denied the right to change his nationality."153 
Of interest in the case of Hong Kong is the question of withdrawal of 
nationality.154 The common view among jurists is that in the absence of 
treaty obligations states have an unlimited competence to withdraw na-
tionality, though "general community expectations would today appear to 
be moving toward restricting such allegedly 'unlimited' competence."155 
Clearly, community policies in the field of human rights point to this 
trend, including the policy of minimizing statelessness and the peremp-
tory norm (jus cogens) of non-discrimination.156 It is beyond doubt that 
denationalization measures based on racial, ethnic, religious, or other re-
lated grounds are impermissible under contemporary international law.157 
While nationality is a matter for domestic law, it also involves con-
cerns at the international level, particularly with regard to the question of 
statelessness. The status of statelessness "entails a most severe and dra-
matic deprivation of the power of an individual . . . . The stateless per-
son — who has been compared to a 'res nullius' — has no state to 'pro-
tect' him and lacks even the freedom of movement to find a state that is 
willing to protect him."158 In other words, a stateless person has no ave-
nue to act against a state which acts abusively towards him. Indeed, the 
list of deprivations visited upon the stateless individual is very long.159 
Not surprisingly, the international community has sought to elimi-
nate or reduce statelessness since World War I. The earliest effort was the 
Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness signed on April 12, 
1930, which was concerned with the avoidance of statelessness at birth.1*0 
The wholesale denationalization of people during the Second World War 
prompted international action in the form of Article 15 of the 1948 Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights which stipulates that "[e]veryone has 
the right to a nationality" and "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
153. 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, art. 15(2), U.N. Res. 217A (III), 3(1) 
U.N. GAOR at 71, reprinted in , P. WEISS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 264-9 (2d. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Human Rights]. 
154. As we shall note later, the UK government in its memorandum attached to the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration, has declared that all persons who on June 30, 1997 are Brit-
ish Dependent Territories Citizens (BDTCs) under the law in force in the UK will cease to 
be BDTCs with effect from July 1, 1997. 
155. McDougal, supra note 151, at 569. 
156. See Human Rights, supra note 153, at 125. 
157. See P. WEISS, supra note 153 . After a study of state practice and judicial deci-
sions on denationalization measures, he concluded that the right of a state to make rules 
governing the loss of nationality is in principle unrestricted, although he nonetheless ac-
knowledges the existence of a possible exception in the case of denationalization on the 
grounds of race, etc. Id. 
158. McDougal, supra note 151, at 605. 
159. Id. at 605-7. 
160. 179 L.T.S. 115, reprinted in 5 M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 364 (1937). 
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his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality."161 An in-
ternational conference, convened by the General Assembly in 1961, 
adopted a UN Convention on Reduction of Statelessness which came into 
force in 1975.1*2 The Convention provides, inter alia, that a person who 
would otherwise be stateless be given the opportunity to acquire the na-
tionality of the country of birth, or of one of the parents at the date of 
birth and that a loss of nationality be conditional upon the acquisition of 
another nationality.163 
Similar principles have evolved in relation to the question of succes-
sion to nationality. Under international law there is no obligation im-
posed on the successor state to grant any right of option as to citizenship, 
nor is there any corresponding obligation on the predecessor state to 
withdraw its nationality from persons normally living or domiciled in the 
transferred territory. 
The position adopted by courts in the UK suggests that English law 
deprives inhabitants of their nationality when the territory is lost, unless 
they take steps to retain it.1*4 This rule, however, is predicated on the 
acquisition by these inhabitants of the nationality of the successor state, 
and that English law will not render a former national stateless as a result 
of the transfer of sovereignty over British territory. 
The question as to who constitutes an "inhabitant" is generally an-
swered with reference to the concept of "substantial connection" with the 
territory by citizenship, residence or family relation. The above rule may 
be construed as a special aspect of the general principle of "real and ef-
fective link" confirmed in the Nottebaum case.1*5 It possible to argue, 
however, that for the individuals concerned at the moment of transfer, 
the connection with the successor state is fortuitous, while a connection 
with the territory is of great significance.1** One should not view territory 
as an "empty plot," rather, "territory connotes population, ethnic group-
ings, loyalty patterns, national aspirations" and so forth.167 Thus, to re-
gard a population as related to particular areas of territory is "to recog-
nize a human and political reality which underlies modern territorial 
settlements."168 Indeed, this seems to be the basis of the self determina-
tion principle, which tends to create demands for changes in territorial 
sovereignty. Employing the above reasoning, Brownlie concludes that 
since the population has a "territorial" or local status, that is, the "popu-
lation goes with the territory," it would be illegal for the transferor to 
161. Human Rights, art. 15, supra note 153. 
162. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 9/15, 989 
U.N.T.S. 175. 
163. Id. 
164. See, e.g., Murray v. Parkes [1942] 2 K.B. 123. 
165. Nottebaum Case (Lich. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4. 
166. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 661 (3rd. ed. 1979). 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
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retain the population as its own nationals, and on the other hand, it 
would be illegal for the successor to take any steps to avoid responsibility 
for the population, such as, by treating them as de facto stateless. This 
conclusion, as well as the principles outlined above, should be born in 
mind in evaluating those provisions in the Sino-British Joint Declaration 
concerning nationality. 
The status of persons who are now British Dependent Territorial Cit-
izens (BDTC) are covered in two memoranda which were formally ex-
changed between the British and Chinese Governments on the same day 
that the Joint Delaration was signed. The memoranda set out the respec-
tive positions of the two governments on this subject.169 
The UK position was that since Hong Kong will no longer be a Brit-
ish dependent territory after 1997, it would not be appropriate for 
BDTCs to retain this status. The affected people, the Government de-
clared, would be entitled to a new status with an appropriate title, now 
referred to as British Nationals (Overseas) (BNOs), that would not entitle 
them to a right of abode in the UK (which they do not presently possess), 
but would carry benefits similar to those currently enjoyed by BDTCs.170 
Such a status, according to the UK Memorandum, is not transferable by 
descent.171 There is also the condition that these BDTCs have possession 
of or be included in passports of parents with the British passport before 
July 1, 1997. This effectively excludes holders of Certificates of Identity 
(CIs), who make up half of those people who possess some sort of a travel 
document and who would not be entitled to the new passport.172 
The Chinese Memorandum states that all Hong Kong Chinese are 
Chinese nationals under the Nationality Law of the PRC.173 It allows Chi-
nese nationals who hold British travel documents to continue to use them 
after July 1, 1997 for the purpose of traveling to other states and regions. 
The PRC Memorandum emphasizes, however, that these persons will not 
be entitled to British consular protection in the Hong Kong SAR and 
169. Before recounting the substantive aspects of the Memoranda, it should be empha-
sized that doubts have been expressed with regard to the binding force of the Memoranda. 
Critics have alleged that they do not amount to a joint statement but simply constitute 
declarations made by individual countries. The implication is that the effectiveness of the 
relevant provisions depends on what measures each of the two states would take to render 
its Memorandum binding. Report of the Independent Monitoring Team, Arrangements for 
Testing the Acceptibility in Hong Kong of the Draft Agreement on the Future of the Terri-
tory (Nov. 1984) ch. 4, pt 4. 
170. These benefits include entitlement to use British passports and to receive British 
consular services and protection in third countries. 
171. The Draft Agreement, supra note 1, at 1381. 
172. The Hong Kong people at present hold one of two kinds of travel documents, a 
British passport or a Certificate of Identity, which do not offer equal travelling rights. 
173. While the PRC has integrated jus sanguinis with jus soli in its nationality law, it 
clearly considers jus sanguinis as the first and primary principle. Thus persons may acquire 
Chinese nationality through parent-offspring relations whether they are born in China or 
abroad. Wau Keju, Basic Principles of the Nationality Law, 1982 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. 
220. 
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other parts of China. 
B. The Fate of the Non-Chinese Residents of Hong Kong 
While the Memoranda may have defined the position of most of the 
territory's residents for fifty years after 1997, it has left doubts among 
those who are neither Chinese nor expatriates holding foreign passports 
as to their nationality status in post-1997 Hong Kong. These people are 
at present BDTCs who will be entitled like others to the new British 
passport, but whose position appears to differ from people of Chinese 
race. The latter will be considered PRC nationals for whom the travel 
document issued by the British Government will merely amount to an 
"extra privilege," theoretically facilitating their geographical mobility. 
Indeed, it is clear that the UK authorities did not mean to confer 
nationality by the issuance of the new passport, for China would never 
have agreed to dual nationality.174 While, arguably, a dual authorized 
passport may be prima facie evidence of nationality,175 there have been 
judicial decisions to the effect that a passport is not conclusive proof of 
nationality, except in conjunction with other evidence.176 Basically, a 
passport is an identity document for travel purposes and identity may be 
certified by non-national as well as by national states. In fact, there is 
nothing to prevent a state from issuing a passport to an alien.177 Thus, 
the mere fact that one holds a travel document issued by the UK Govern-
ment would not, in the eyes of third countries, confer upon one the status 
of a British national. 
Based upon these assumptions, it follows that the minority groups in 
question would in effect be stateless. Clearly, under the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration, the next generation born to those BDTCs would be stateless 
since the new status is not transferrable. However, according to the Joint 
Declaration, such persons may have the right of abode (i.e., to enter, re-
enter, live and work) in Hong Kong by virtue of their continuous resi-
dence of at least seven years and the fact that they have taken the terri-
tory to be their place of permanent residence.178 Nevertheless, a right of 
abode is quite distinct from the concept of nationality. Even if the child 
of a non-Chinese BDTC acquires the right of abode, he can still be judged 
stateless under international law if he does not possess nationality. 
174. 1980 Nationality Law of the PRC, article 3. This article states: "[t]hat the PRC 
does not recognize dual nationality for any Chinese national." Non-recognition of dual na-
tionality, or the principle of "one nationality for one person,"is in fact the major concept of 
China's nationality law. The PRC attaches great importance to this question and has been 
determined to eliminate dual nationality whether through its nationality laws or within bi-
lateral treaties. 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 23, at 746. See also Ginsberg, The Nationality 
Law of the PRC, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 458 (1982). 
175. See, e.g., Rv. Brailsford [1905] 2 K.B. 730, 745; Joyce v. D.P.P. 1946 A.C 347. 
176. J.G. STARKE, supra note 124, at 331. 
177. Though for obvious reasons it would not normally do so, especially since a pass-
port is the basis on which a person can invoke the protection of a particular embassy. 
178. The Draft Agreement, annex I, § XIV, supra note 1, at 1377-78. 
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As observed earlier, the international community has laid down cer-
tain rules in an attempt to eliminate or at least minimize statelessness. 
Indeed, under the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 
Britain, as a party, is bound to grant nationality to people born in its 
territory who would otherwise be stateless.17* It is also obliged, according 
to this Convention, to use its best endeavors to include in any treaty 
which it makes with a non-contracting state (such as the PRC), provi-
sions designed to ensure that no person shall become stateless as a result 
of transfer of sovereignty.180 
Forced into a difficult position by the uncompromising Chinese pos-
ture on the one hand (the PRC objected to the transferability of the new 
status for ex-BDTCs) and its own international commitments on the 
other, the UK Government has devised a typically awkward formula. It 
has opted to sidestep the issue altogether by creating yet another form of 
British nationality. The "status B" or the British Overseas Citizen (BOC) 
will cover two categories of people: the post-1997 babies and what is ex-
pected to be a very small number of non-Chinese people who are BDTCs 
on June 30, 1997 but who, for one reason or another, have by then not 
succeeded to obtain a passport entitling them to the BNO status (for ex-
ample, they might be in prison, hospital or for some other unforeseen 
reason). 
Both types of nationality are non-transferable, thus, there are no ar-
rangements to prevent statelessness for children of BOCs. Likewise, both 
BNOs and BOCs may use UK passports and enjoy British consular pro-
tection. The major difference, however, lies in admission to third coun-
tries, for BOCs would, in all probability, be perceived as stateless. Indeed, 
the key question with regard to both these new types of passports is 
whether third countries are likely to accept and recognize them. Propos-
als have been made to indicate in the new passports the holder's right of 
abode in Hong Kong to facilitate acceptance by other countries.181 
There are additional gaps in the protection of ethnic minorities 
under the Sino-British Joint Declaration. For one, it is not clear whether 
they would enjoy British consular protection in the Hong Kong SAR 
since they are not Chinese nationals, or what other consular protection 
these people might be entitled to in the territory after 1997. On the ques-
tion of repatriation, which country a non-Chinese BNO travelling on 
BNO travel documents should be repatriated to is not clear. Obviously, it 
should not be to the UK because he has no right of abode there. At the 
same time, the British consul presumably helping the BNO would not be 
able to repatriate him to Hong Kong, since he will have no jurisdiction 
over the Hong Kong SAR. 
179. Convention on Statelessness, art. 10, supra note 162. 
180. Id. 
181. Legislative Council Debate on Febuary 6,1985. South China Morning Post, Feb. 7, 
1985, at 10. 
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In sum, the Joint Declaration falls short, both in terms of form and 
substance, of prevailing international legal standards on nationality. A 
sizeable minority of the local population is to be rendered effectively 
stateless and, while informal assurances have been given by the UK au-
thorities, they are not only vague but lacking in crediblity. This is espe-
cially true in view of the fact that British attitudes towards admission of 
minority groups into the UK are likely to grow more, rather than less, 
hostile. 
This situation extends beyond the legal matter of creating a stateless 
minority. The transition from British to Chinese control is unprece-
dented, in that it entails the transfer of a substantial population from a 
relatively benevolent rule to one which may prove to be difficult to en-
dure. There are hopes that the PRC would continue to pursue a more 
enlightened path, but these hopes might easily crumble. By Western cri-
teria, China remains an essentially oppressive country and the Hong 
Kong people, most of whom may be seen as refugees from communism, 
are likely to be denied the power to choose their nationality. 
Whether the UK could have provided such a choice is a moot point, 
yet one is inclined to argue that the British are mistaken in perceiving 
people as a liability rather than an asset. An infusion of a large number of 
industrious and entrepreneurial Chinese would have done much to revi-
talize their sagging economy. It is not realistic to expect the UK to mod-
ify its narrow attitude, but it is conceivable that other countries, particu-
larly the United States, would prove more forthcoming in this respect. 
Indeed, the availability of a potential exit option to local business people 
and professionals might prompt the PRC to be more accomodating vis-a-
vis Hong Kong. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
British rule over Hong Kong will come to an end in 1997 after a cen-
tury and a half of colonial control in the Western mold. The gradual dis-
engagement by the UK and the eventual departure of its official repre-
sentatives may turn out to be one of the most significant international 
developments in the coming decades. One hopes that the assumption of 
the exercise of sovereignty by the PRC will not disrupt the territory's 
stable and prosperous existence, but a pessimistic scenario cannot be dis-
missed lightly. For this reason, it behooves international lawyers to scru-
tinize the Sino-British Joint Declaration with a view to determining its 
viability as a foundation for the Hong Kong SAR. 
The Joint Declaration has its share of detractors. As argued here, the 
criticisms levelled at it are not always warranted, for it provides a sound 
formal mechanism for territorial autonomy within the sovereign frame-
work of the PRC. There are also significant reasons to postulate that this 
document constitutes a valid bilateral international treaty, creating legal 
rights and imposing legal obligations on the signatories. Some of its provi-
sions, most notably those concerning nationality, may be inadequate, but 
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its value as a formal basis for the preservation of the Hong Kong lifestyle 
in a communist context cannot be questioned. 
Needless to say, however, the implementation of the Joint Declara-
tion hinges primarily on factors which lie outside the strictly conceived 
legal realm. Future Chinese attitudes and policies, developments within 
Hong Kong, and third parties' response are likely to exert a far greater 
influence than the agreement itself. Sustained negative pressures from 
the above sources might undermine the "one country, two systems" 
formula and render the agreement effectively void. 
The international community should not, therefore, be content with 
the Joint Declaration as such, but should act in various ways to ensure 
that its substance is not dissipated. It is imperative for the Hong Kong 
issue to remain one of international concern and not be removed from the 
international agenda. While the PRC is inclined to exclude any interna-
tional involvement in what it deems to be an internal affair, subtle exter-
nal pressure could be brought to bear upon it. The Hong Kong people 
enjoy a wide range of rights, and the preservation of these rights falls 
within the ambit of international law. 
The Sino-British Agreement also calls for greater attention on the 
part of international legal scholars, whether they are motivated by hu-
manitarian considerations or otherwise. The "one country, two systems" 
formula which it embodies is unprecedented and thus opens up new vis-
tas in international legal research. Should the formula prove viable it 
might constitute a model for the resolution of similar international 
problems. Even if it fails to satisfy the expectations of interested parties, 
the concept is doubtless an intriguing one and its various aspects ought to 
be thoroughly explored. 
